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The transition of a small number of developing countries to high living standards over 
the last four decades has opened up an important debate within economics. What are 
the necessary economic and institutional conditions for sustained and rapid 
improvements in living standards? This question goes to the heart of many current 
debates on the role of markets and states during the economic and social 
transformation that successful developing countries have gone through. Most 
economists will agree about a number of broad features that characterize these 
successful catching up experiences. Successful developing countries had high savings 
and investment rates, they rapidly began to export high-value added manufactured 
products, they were open to world markets to acquire technology and to export, in all 
these countries private sector capitalists were important players, but states too played 
key roles. However, beyond these very general observations, there is little agreement 
about what needs to be done in the next tier of developing countries that want to 
follow the example of the high-growth countries. What are the institutional 
preconditions, economic policies and state capacities that are needed? We identify a 
number of critical questions and issues that have emerged in the policy discussions on 
these issues and then identify a number of research questions relevant for Vietnam. 
 
i) Creating Market Opportunities or Organizing Social Transformations. Should 
policy-makers focus on making markets more efficient, or does the achievement of 
the conditions for sustained growth require a more fundamental and far-reaching 
social transformation in the developing country? This critical issue has been debated 
for a long time, going back to debates amongst historians, and particularly Marxist 
historians, on the conditions that explained the transition from feudalism to capitalism 
in Western Europe. This is an important question because capitalism as a new and 
radically more dynamic economic system first emerged in England, and then in the 
rest of Western Europe. Yet, for a long time, these areas had been relatively 
technologically and commercially backward compared to many countries in Asia and 
the Middle East. How can we explain why capitalism emerged in England and not in 
China, India or the Middle East, which at different times were more technologically 
advanced than Europe and had more stable state organizations? Two sorts of 
explanations have been put forward, and the divide between them is still relevant for 
understanding contemporary debates on the determinants of and obstacles to the 
transition to high-productivity economies in developing countries today.  
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The first type of explanation argued that capitalism was essentially the freeing up of 
market opportunities. The transition to capitalism happened in those countries where 
the obstacles to the market were first removed. These obstacles included political 
obstacles, for instance, feudalism itself set up many barriers to the movement of 
labour and capital, and prevented land being freely sold. Other obstacles to the market 
were ideological or religious barriers that prevented markets from becoming the main 
regulator of resource allocation in society. For a variety of reasons, the argument was 
that these obstacles were first overcome in Western Europe because internal and 
external factors weakened feudal restrictions and ideologies and allowed the market to 
grow. The group of historians and economists making this case often differed on 
which obstacles were more important and the mechanisms through which they were 
overcome, but they agreed that capitalism emerged because of the removal of 
obstacles to the market . Despite important differences between them on other issues, 
Marxist historians such as Maurice Dobb (1946) and Paul Sweezy (1950) as well as 
non-Marxist economic historians such as Douglass North (1990) shared this view of 
capitalism emerging through the extension of a market economy. In many ways, the 
modern neoclassical economics position on how to construct the institutional 
conditions for a dynamic economy are very close to this historical position. It 
implicitly argues that if obstacles to a freely working and competitive market can be 
rapidly removed, economic growth will accelerate. 
 
In contrast to this position, the more conventional Marxist position has been to 
sharply distinguish between the market and capitalism. This distinction is important 
because the market has existed for thousands of years without leading to capitalism, 
and so something much more special was involved in the emergence of capitalism. 
Moreover, areas that were relatively more commercialized, such as Florence, the 
Maghreb, or the Baltic states did not make the first transition to capitalism. Nor was 
there any sign of capitalism in India or China despite the presence of widespread 
long-distance trade within these empires and between them and the rest of the world. 
If capitalism depends on how extensive your markets are, India, China and the Italian 
city states should have been more developed capitalist economies than England in the 
sixteenth or seventeenth century, and should have had much stronger internal social 
pressures for further removing the obstacles to the growth of the market. Therefore 
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the conventional Marxist view argues that capitalism was not just about more fully 
exploiting market opportunities, but rather about the imposition of a completely new 
structure of property rights and institutions.  
 
Capitalism was not just more markets, but a unique system where for the first time, 
the market operated in such a way that productivity was rapidly enhanced and 
technological progress happened in a sustained manner. The reason was not just that 
the role of the market was extended, but rather that capitalism was based on a class 
who owned the means of production and a propertyless class of workers who were 
forced to work for them. The structure of rights was such that both capitalists and 
workers had to continuously improve their productivity simply in order to survive. 
Robert Brenner (1976, 1985) and Ellen Meiksins Wood (2002) have powerfully 
represented this position, and it can be argued that this was much closer to the 
position of Marx himself in his analysis of primitive accumulation. Marx pointed out 
for the first time the significance of the forced transfer of land to an emerging class of 
agrarian capitalists that had been essential for the creation of capitalism in England. 
This analysis suggests that the reason why capitalism emerged in England first and 
then in Western Europe had little to do with removing obstacles to the market, and 
much more to do with internal class struggles and state strategies that allowed the 
property rights necessary for a capitalist economy to emerge. The historical evidence 
can be read as being strongly in favour of this second interpretation of the conditions 
under which capitalism emerged in the West. If this view is correct, it has enormous 
significance for current debates on the institutional conditions for rapid productivity 
growth in developing countries. Dynamic economies are unlikely to emerge simply by 
removing obstacles to the market and trying to make markets more efficient. Rather, 
we have to ask what rights and institutions are necessary in the context of the 
contemporary world economy for rapid productivity growth, and how these can be 
introduced. This perspective suggests that development involves a social 
transformation and opens up the possibility that far from market-enhancing strategies 
being sufficient, the state may have to play a lead role in organizing this social 
transformation. 
 
ii) Classical Capitalism versus Late Development. Even if we agree that the 
establishment of capitalism in the early developers required important non-market 
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processes such as primitive accumulation, it is not at all clear that the property rights 
and institutions that were appropriate for the early developers would be appropriate 
for late developers. In early developers, the creation of a propertyless class of workers 
and a class of asset owners who were competing amongst themselves to survive was 
sufficient to ensure relatively rapid productivity growth through market competition. 
It is not clear that a similar structure of rights in contemporary developing countries 
would have the same effect, given that now developing countries have to catch up 
with advanced countries who already have higher productivity and better technologies 
than they do. A catching-up country that had free trade would very likely be stuck 
with low-technology production. This is because the only technology that is viable in 
a low productivity country is technology that is no longer viable in any advanced 
country because too much of expensive labour is required. The developmental state 
literature (Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara 1997 and many others), and the case 
studies of catching-up countries such as South Korea (Amsden 1989) and Taiwan 
(Wade 1990) show that successful catching up has required a range of institutions and 
interventions that are quite different from classical capitalism.  
 
Thus, the social transformation in late developers is likely to be quite different from 
the social transformation that happened in early developers. Not only would late 
developers have to organize a different type of primitive accumulation, to take 
account of the fact that the scale and capital- intensity of high productivity production 
was now much greater, they would also have to organize catching-up strategies to 
acquire technologies that allowed them to compete. We will see that this imposes new 
challenges on the role of the state during the social transformation.  
 
iii) “Good Governance” and “Investment Climate” in mainstream economics are 
defined as if development can be achieved simply by removing obstacles in the 
path of efficient markets. The mainstream consensus today (which is surprisingly 
similar to the minority position in classical Marxism) is that a perfectly-working 
market is capitalism. Policy is therefore aimed at creating this competitive market. 
What is required (in the conventional wisdom) for such a market? First, we require 
stable property rights, defined by low expropriation risk. Note that we do not require 
any specific structure of property rights, all we need is that all existing rights should 
be well-defined and non-expropriable. It does not matter if existing rights are peasant 
 5 
rights over land or very large unproductive landlords, or anything else. The 
assumption is that as soon as we have property rights with low expropriation risk, 
transaction costs will fall, and efficient allocations will follow. The point made by 
Brenner and Wood that markets did not lead to capitalism emerging for thousands of 
years till forced changes in rights happened by accident in England in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries has to be answered by these theorists. Secondly, well-
working markets require no intervention by states, so it is assumed that a well-
working capitalism also requires the absence of state intervention. Intervention creates 
rents (incomes above opportunity incomes) and this impedes the operation of 
competitive markets. Third, well-working markets require the absence of rent-seeking 
and corruption since these processes create rents and destabilize property rights. 
Finally, we need to have democracy to make a market economy work. It is assumed 
that since rent seeking benefits a minority, the majority will use democracy to ensure 
that rent seeking does not happen. All of this is theoretical. What is the evidence that 
good governance was necessary for generating economic dynamism in any 
developing country? 
 
iv) The Evidence. While a lot of cross-sectional evidence is presented in support of 
the conventional models, these regression exercises do not actually support the claims 
that are made (see Khan 2002 for a critique). Figure 1 plots Knack and Keefer's 
Property Right Stability Index (incorporating corruption, rule of law, bureaucratic 
quality, government contract repudiation and expropriation risk) for 1984, the earliest 
available year, against GDP growth rates for the decade 1980-90. We can treat 1984 
as the index for the beginning of the period in question. The interesting observation is 
that while the regression line has the expected positive slope, (though the R bar square 
is only 0.03), the countries in our sample separate into three quite separate groups. 
Most countries belong to either group 1 (low-growth developing countries, defined by 
a growth rate below the advanced country average) or group 3 (advanced 
industrialized countries, defined by their per capita incomes).  
 
The characteristics of these two groups are that the first has low growth (by 
definition) and poor governance characteristics, while the latter group has higher 
growth and the best governance characteristics. The most interesting group is, 
however, group 2 (developing countries that are catching-up by virtue of having 
 6 
higher growth rates than the advanced countries). This group is interesting because 
though the countries in it are not numerous enough to make a difference to the slope 
of the regression line, they were the only ones that were actually catching up. A visual 
examination of the data shows that while their growth was significant, their property 
right and other governance characteristics were not significantly different from the 
developing country average. This observation is particularly significant given that the 
data is already biased in some of the ways we have mentioned earlier. High-growth 
countries are likely to generate subjective indices of governance that are better, and 
moreover, because they have already grown for some time, we would expect their 
governance characteristics to be better as a result of growth rather than simply being 
exogenously better.  
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Figure 1 The Relationship between Stable Property Rights and Growth 
 
This evidence raises a very important question for catching-up policies in developing 
countries. Do group 1 countries try to reach group 3 by first emulating the governance 
characteristics of group 3 countries, or do they look at history and try to attain the 
governance characteristics of group 2 countries, as these are the only countries that 
are actually catching up? The route to group 3 may be through group 2, in which case, 
the relevant institutional capacities for group 1 countries should be sought in group 2 
rather than group 3. Whatever the critical institutional and governance characteristics 
that created a good investment climate in group 2 countries, these are not readily 
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described as stable property rights and other characteristics that good governance 
theory identifies. 
 
But our main concern is with the theory. Underlying the good governance and 
investment climate approaches is a theory of capitalist development that has many 
weaknesses. These theories are based on observations of capitalist economies in 
advanced countries, but the theoretical mechanisms they assume may not be 
appropriate for emerging capitalist economies. In particular, the focus on stable 
property rights and the creation of a well-working market needs to be questioned. 
While these are important characteristics of an advanced capitalist economy, creating 
a capitalist economy always requires substantial restructuring of pre-existing property 
rights and incentives for emerging capitalists to rapidly acquire new technologies. 
During this transition, the condition of stable property rights is an odd one to aim for; 
particularly since the existing structure of rights and production systems are by 
definition of low productivity. The real question is whether we can ensure that the 
economic and social restructuring that is taking place is taking the country in the 
direction of a viable capitalist economy or not. The danger is that the good 
governance and investment climate approaches are in fact bypassing asking difficult 
questions about the social transformation and instead they focus on reforms that 
would make an already existing capitalist market economy work better. This assumes 
that a capitalist market economy exists in the first place, and in most developing 
countries, the insignificance of the capitalist sector is the main problem. 
 
vi) Why does capital not flow to cheap labour countries? The issues of primitive 
accumulation and technology acquisition would be less significant if the market 
actually operated in the way in which it is supposed to operate in theory. In theory, if 
a market exists, and a country has cheaper labour than another, capital should flow to 
the cheap labour country. But this theory ignores that competitiveness and 
productivity are only high in some countries because the social structure imposes 
compulsions for high productivity. If productivity is low and does not grow, low 
wages by themselves will not attract investment.  
 
This is a simple matter of arithmetic. Even if wages in the developing country are 
1/20th that in an advanced country, if productivity is 1/40th, unit labour costs are twice 
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as high in the developing country. Productivity differentials between advanced and 
developing countries are likely to be particularly high in high technology industries, 
and less so in low technology industries. This, rather than the relative cost of labour 
and capital explains why only low productivity industries are likely to migrate to 
developing countries if they simply rely on markets with no internal strategy of social 
transformation. A powerful evidence of this is the recent example of Mexico, which 
joined the US in a free trade zone (NAFTA) in 1994. After ten years, Mexico’s 
average per capita income growth over this period was barely 1%, far lower than East 
Asian countries that do not have duty free access and free capital flows with the US 
(Stiglitz 2004). 
 
vii) How have successful countries managed to ensure investment in high 
productivity industries? The conventional explanations of why some countries have 
been more successful in sustaining high technology investments have focused on 
infrastructure and education. These are important points but they do not go far 
enough. Many successful countries like Taiwan and South Korea in the sixties were 
building infrastructure at the same time as they were industrializing, rather than good 
infrastructure explaining their industrialization. The same is true of China today, 
where industrialization is running ahead of infrastructural capacity. So, while 
infrastructure in general is important, it cannot on its own explain why some countries 
have been much faster in moving up the technology ladder.  
 
The key factor that determines whether high value-added industries will be set up is 
the institutional structure that determines whether high value-added sectors can be 
operated at high productivity. The basic problem with setting up high productivity 
industries is that learning how to use high technology machines, and setting up all the 
internal and externa l systems that are required to maximize productivity takes time. 
This very simple point was made a long time ago by Kenneth Arrow who introduced 
the term “learning-by-doing” to describe the fact that productivity was always 
initially low with new machines, and only gradually improved as a result of learning 
how to use them. This means that unless there is some institutional system that can 
both allow this learning to take place, and ensure that resources are not wasted if 
learning fails, investment in high productivity sectors is unlikely to happen.  
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Figure 2 Conditional Subsidies and Rents for Learning    Source: Khan (2000a: Figure 1.8) 
 
The basic problem can be shown using a very simple diagram shown in Figure 2. It 
shows that domestic productivity in the developing country is initially so low, that if it 
imports the potentially high-productivity foreign technology, it can initially have 
higher marginal costs than the advanced country. But this is only because productivity 
is low because of the absence of learning, not because it is permanently going to be 
low. So how does the developing country overcome this hurdle? The simplest way to 
acquire the learning is the classical infant industry strategy of providing a conditional 
subsidy or “learning rent” for a fixed period, with the condition that the subsidy will 
be withdrawn at the end of the period, or even earlier if performance is poor. In our 
diagram, a subsidy of ABCD to the domestic industry allows it to produce OQ1 of 
output. By allowing the industry to produce and the worker and managers to set up the 
systems and incentives for productivity growth, over time, productivity can rise, 
reducing marginal cost to the advanced country level or even below, given the wage 
advantage. But in the short run, these strategies have a cost, because they allow static 
inefficiency by allowing a loss-making industry to survive. The short run cost will 
only be worthwhile if the subsidy succeeds in generating long term productivity 
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growth and the country can enjoy higher living standards as a result. Many developing 
countries attempted these strategies in the past, but only a few succeeded. Providing a 
learning rent for a very short period is just as problematic as providing it for too long. 
If the state does not have the credibility to be able to withdraw a subsidy when there is 
underperformance then not only will there be a short-run cost, there will be a 
permanent cost because infant industries will never grow up.  
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Figure 3 Rent-Management in the case of Learning Rents 
 
Figure 3 shows that to ensure productivity growth even in the simplest case of 
learning rents, fairly demanding conditions are required of the state. In the case of 
direct subsidies to learning industries, critical conditions for success include a 
capacity of the state to pragmatically monitor and make judgements about 
performance, and the capacity to re-allocate subsidies and assets of non-performers. 
However, direct subsidies to infant industries have not always been the route through 
which late developers have gone up the technology ladder. Moreover, with the advent 
of the WTO, organizing direct subsidies to infant industries is going to be more 
difficult in the future.  
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Despite the WTO, there is no change in the fundamental reasons why the institutional 
structure of early capitalism that was sufficient for ensuring rapid productivity growth 
in the context of the frontier capitalist countries is not likely to work very well in 
catching-up countries. Successful catching-up countries have shown that late 
developers require additional institutional features to ensure productivity growth, 
since capitalist property rights and market competition alone cannot ensure this. If 
direct subsidies have become more difficult, indirect subsidies to learning industries 
and industries bringing in high value-added technologies have to be considered. After 
all, industries in advanced countries receive massive implicit subsidies in the form of 
differential taxation, infrastructure provision, subsidies that provide them with an 
educated work-force and so on. Indirect subsidies have been widely used in 
developing countries, but here too we need to have specific rent-management systems 
to ensure that good economic outcomes are achieved.  
 
Many different mechanisms of hidden subsidies can be identified. These include, for 
example, state involvement in technology licensing from abroad, paying for some of 
the overhead costs and providing technology to domestic producers at a lower cost. 
There could be tax breaks for specific sectors, and these can be related to technology 
acquisition strategies. There can be hidden subsidies in the form of prioritized 
infrastructure for specific sectors. In advanced countries like the USA, government 
purchasing policies in high technology industries like aerospace often allow cost plus 
pricing to be used for part of the sales of specific industries, providing a barely hidden 
subsidy. Competition policy can also be used to allow temporary monopolies in 
specific sectors to allow enterprises to make monopoly rents for a time as a way of 
subsidizing innovation. This is used extensively in advanced countries, as the debate 
over the monopoly status of Microsoft has revealed. In each case, success requires 
complementary rent-management capacities for the state. While they are different in 
each case, they are essentially similar to the basic model that we have set up for the 
simplest case of direct subsidies. In each case, state institutions have to have the 
capacity to identify the degree of support required, and have the capacity to withdraw 
this support when performance is unsatisfactory. These capacities are partly 
institutional and partly political, and are somewhat different for different rent 
management strategies. 
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Identifying and developing the appropriate rent-management capacities must be a 
critical part of any moves towards setting up a developmental state that can organize 
catching up in a developing country. It follows that assisting developing countries to 
develop appropriate rent management capacities can be an important way in which 
these countries can be assisted to raise living standards more rapidly. While 
developing countries are often advised to let the market take its own course, it is 
worth noting that rent-management capacities are recognized as extremely important 
in advanced countries. When the US state considers whether to allow Microsoft to 
keep making its monopoly profits or to break it up, its regulators are precisely 
considering the effects of Microsoft’s profits on its innovation and that of other 
competitors. These are sophisticated state capacities, mistakes will occasionally be 
made, but advanced countries do not rely on the market alone to ensure rapid 
innovation and productivity growth. The need for state rent-management capacities is 
if anything much greater in developing countries. The argument that developing 
country state’s can make mistakes is correct, as is the argument that interventionist 
attempts have often gone wrong in developing countries in the past. But it does not 
follow that developing countries can therefore abandon rent management capacities 
entirely and rely on the entirely on the “market”. This is particularly the case given 
that the historical evidence tells us that raising social productivity, and therefore 
reducing poverty, requires much more than extending markets and relying on 
competition. 
 
 
viii) Growth-Enhancing and Growth-Reducing Rents. While some rents are 
critical for enhancing growth prospects in developing countries, other rents are very 
damaging for growth prospects (see Khan 2000a for a discussion of different types of 
rents). From a policy perspective, we need to point out that potentially growth-
enhancing rents can become growth-reducing if the rent-management capacities of the 
state are missing. For instance, potentially dynamic infant industry subsidies can 
become growth-reducing for the economy if they are allocated without proper 
conditionalities and without a state capacity to monitor and withdraw subsidies in 
underperforming industries.  
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Type of Rent Rent-Management 
Economic 
Outcomes 
Monopoly Rent 
Created in response to special interest 
group pressure  
Negative 
Successful Learning Rents 
(Infant Industry Subsidies, 
Prioritization of Infrastructure, 
Temporary Monopolies) 
Benefits conditional on performance, 
institutional and political capacity for 
monitoring and rent-withdrawal 
Very positive 
Failed Learning Rents 
Powerful groups can protect rents, state 
lacks capacity to independently allocate 
rents, or monitor or withdraw rents from 
underperforming enterprises 
Very negative 
Viable Redistributive Rents 
Extent of redistribution effectively 
controlled, lobbying for these rents kept 
separate from management of learning 
rents 
Mildly negative but 
can be positive if 
benefit of political 
stability included 
Damaging Redistributive Rents 
Growing redistribution, unstable 
coalitions, redistributive coalitions protect 
inefficient learning rents 
Very negative 
 
 
ix) Differences in Rent-Management Systems. When we look at the conditions that 
allowed successful developing countries to maintain growth-enhancing rents and 
remove growth-reducing rents, we see that their success depended on effective rent-
management systems that were appropriate to the rents they were trying to manage. 
The problem of research and for policy is that we find a great number of variations in 
the types of institutions and interventions managing rents in different successful late 
developers because the strategies of technology acquisition differed considerably 
(Khan 2000b). A few examples of technology acquisition strategies and the associated 
rent-management systems will indicate the range of variations that we observe:  
 
a) In the South Korean case, large holding companies, the chaebol, were given 
subsidies to catch up technologically with advanced countries. Here, large companies 
were given the responsibility to acquire high- technology production systems. This 
was the classic infant industry strategy, closest to the situation shown in Figure 2. For 
this system of rent-allocation to work, the state had to operate a rent-management 
 14 
system that involved the executive setting export and other performance targets, and 
making pragmatic judgements about performance based on observed results. The 
success of the South Korean rent-management system depended critically on a 
balance of power between capitalists and the state that prevented inefficient capitalist 
from protecting their subsidies if the state decided to withdraw them. The state on the 
other hand had no incentive to support inefficient capitalists because it could get 
bigger kickbacks and taxes by shifting its support to dynamic capitalists (Amsden 
1989, Khan 2000b). This route of social and economic transformation would be 
difficult to replicate precisely in many developing countries where capitalists can 
easily buy themselves political protection from factions within the state who will 
protect their inefficient rents even if other state agencies try to remove them. 
 
b) In the Malays ian case, technology acquisition was accelerated by providing 
conditions for high-technology multinational companies to invest in Malaysia and 
provide backward linkages to domestic producers. Unlike many other countries, the 
multinationals that came to Malaysia were high-technology companies and they were 
induced to come because the government effectively provided them with hidden 
subsidies. These took the form of prioritization of infrastructure to suit the needs of 
foreign investors and the protection of foreign investors from internal redistributive 
demands. The latter was particularly important because Malaysia’s internal 
redistributive needs were entirely met by taxing domestic capitalists who happened to 
be largely from the minority Chinese community. This effective subsidization of 
multinationals was conditional on high-technology processes being imported because 
the government vetted the technology investors were bringing in, and it ensured that 
low technology investors did not come. The state then ensured that domestic learning 
would also take place by insisting on technology transfer to subcontractors and other 
backward linkages by insisting on local content. But they could do all this because the 
platform that the Malaysian government offered to multinationals was much better 
than that offered by most of Malaysia’s competitors. It may be difficult for other 
countries to repeat the Malaysian experience because the effective subsidization of 
foreign companies is more difficult if domestic capitalists do not come from a 
minority community and are able to resist their effective taxation (Jomo and Edwards 
1993, Khan 2000b). 
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c) In the Taiwanese case, the government encouraged small-scale high technology 
industries in the private sector to acquire high-productivity technologies by 
subsidizing this technology acquisition through state- led technology licensing, and the 
provision of key inputs through a well-run and efficient public sector. The 
coordination of technology licensing by the state meant that in Taiwan, the state 
directly subsidized technology acquisition by passing on this technology to a 
competitive private sector below cost. It then ensured that learning would happen 
because a relatively large number of firms in the private sector would each have 
access to these subsidized technologies, and competition would favour the firms that 
were better at raising productivity rapidly through learning (Wade 1990). For this 
rent-management system to work, the state needed to be able to distance itself 
institutionally and politically from the competitive private sector, so that rent seeking 
by individual firms within this sector did not affect state decisions on technology 
policy. This can be difficult to repeat in other countries where the state is not 
artificially separated from the private sector as it was in Taiwan because of the 
historical accident. The Taiwanese state was led largely by mainland Chinese 
following their expulsion from mainland China in 1949 and the business sector was 
composed largely of local Taiwanese. This political distance proved to be very useful 
in operating this rent-management system because local business interests could not 
influence state-led technology acquisition to favour particular groups at the expense 
of national interests, nor could any group use political power to acquire monopoly 
power in the domestic market.  
 
The policy question for the next tier of developers is to construct the institutions 
required for high-growth. We have argued that this is not going to be achieved by 
simply pushing market-enhancing reforms because it also involves much more 
difficult processes of changing social structures and institutions to compel 
productivity growth. Productivity growth is not an easy or effortless task, and it has 
not happened in any country without institutions that compelled productivity growth. 
We have described the creation of these new institutions and rights as a social 
transformation and we find that in successful developers, the state played a key role in 
driving this social transformation. In the early developers, the social transformation 
was achieved by creating capitalist property rights. This was sufficient to achieve 
rapid productivity growth, because capitalist market competition was a sufficient 
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mechanism of compulsion to force productivity growth in the early developers. But in 
late developers market competition between capitalists had to be augmented by a 
number of different rent-management systems that allowed the rate of technology 
acquisition to be maximized.  
 
To determine the nature of the rent-management system that will work in different 
contexts, we have to start by looking at the technology challenges that the country 
faces. We first need to identify the key sectors where technology upgrading is socially 
desirable, to enable the country to move to the next tier of technologies. As we have 
seen, different strategies of technology acquisition exist, and new ones may evolve in 
the future. Our second task is then to identify the different strategies through which 
technology acquisition may be promoted in the sector identified. Each of these 
strategies has an associated system of rent management and we then have to identify 
the institutional and political conditions that are required for each of these strategies 
to work. The aim is to identify the strategy that is most likely to work in our specific 
country given pre-existing political and institutional conditions. In other words, if we 
are considering Vietnam, we need to ask whether Vietnam can make feasible changes 
in its internal political and institutional capacities to follow South Korean, Malaysian, 
Taiwanese or other strategies of social transformation. If not, is there an alternative 
rent-management strategy that can accelerate technology acquisition in the 
Vietnamese sectors we are considering and which can be implemented given 
Vietnam’s political and institutional conditions? These judgements clearly require an 
appreciation of what is politically feasible, as well as an understanding of the 
economics of technology acquisition. Recommendations can then be made to policy-
makers about feasible reforms in political and institutional conditions to allow the 
technology acquisition strategy that we have identified to be implemented.  
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